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Abstract
This paper presents a model accounting for the impact of the Chinese rural-urban migration
on the stock of aggregate saving and the skill composition of the urban labor force. The novel
mechanism through which immigration a¤ects labor-market outcomes is the availability of new
loanable funds for investment, which also results in endogenous skill upgrading. Given their
rural hukou, which determines their higher training costs in the city, migrants skip the nancial
costs of human capital or residential investment. As a result, they self select as net lenders,
which reduces the equilibrium local interest rates and facilitates the investment mostly of new
generations of urbanites. Consequently, the aggregate labor income of people with urban hukou
increases with immigration.
1 Introduction
In the year 1978 only 18% of Chinas population lived in cities, which was clearly less than the
average low income country by then. By 2003, Chinas number of cities (and the average city
size) had grown up rapidly and its urbanization rate had reached 41%, a gure similar to the
expected level for a developing country of its income per capita (Naughton, 2007). However, the
main turning point in the urbanization rate took place by the year 2000 (Huang, 2010). Two
fundamental causes determined this important phenomenon: a widespread rural-urban migration
and the spatial expansion of the urban boundaries that encroached upon previously rural areas.
Simultaneously, the Chinese ratio of consumption over GDP also experienced a substantial and
prolonged decay, starting from the year 2000. The domestic saving rate in 2006 also reached an
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astonishing 52% (Vendryes, 2011). Therefore, both the urbanization and the consumption decline
went hand in hand with each other, which is an "intriguing empirical conuence" (Huang, 2010).
In this paper we will introduce a stylized model able to account for these coincidental facts, whose
nal verication could be relevant for the global nancial imbalances experienced recently by the
world economy (Rajan, 2010).
The hukou registration system in China is highly discriminatory against the oating population
of rural-hukou holders residing in the main urban centers. They face a much more di¢ cult access
to health, pension, housing or education public services there. However, once these disfavored ur-
ban residents get acquainted with the reality of urban private markets, they usually change their
aspirations and become eager to accumulate, trying to ascend socially and upgrade their intergen-
erational status. In this sense, our theoretical chain of causality is related to their incentives to
save, in the context of hukou restrictions that set very high costs of human capital acquisition or
entrepreneurship for them.
"One of the main drivers of Chinas phenomenal economic growth during the past three decades
has been the large-scale and persistent rural-to-urban migration" (Chen and Feng, 2012). The 2010
census registers the existence of about 260 million of "non-hukou" people who work and live in a lo-
cality other than his/her o¢ cial hukou is registered at. Given that funding for elementary education
is allocated by the number of children with local hukou and is not portable across administrative
units, a signicant portion of the migrant students have to enter the (so called) "migrant schools",
started as informal schools by migrants themselves. Needless to say, the consequences of this dis-
criminatory educational policy a¤ect their lifetime welfare, their exposure to poverty and crime and
their sense of exclusion from both the rural and urban identities (Solinger, 1999).
Like immigrant labor in other settings, they are "eager to earn money at any price [...], grateful
for the chance to live at the city, vulnerable to threats of deportation, and powerless because of
the states unwillingness to o¤er them rights, welfare or security" (Roberts, 2007). This is a move
between two worlds, even if it is within a single region or country. Nevertheless, their saving rates
are much higher than those of urban-hukou residents, which may have been boosting accumulation
and investment in the Chinese economy (Huang, 2010; Brugiavini, Weber and Wu, 2010).1
When asked about the reasons why they save, Huang (2010) reports that education (40%) tops
1According to Huang (2010)s survey, "in 2007, the urban-hukou household saving rate for Guangzhou is 15.6%;
for Shenzen it is 27.5%. By contrast, the rural migrant workers in Guangzhou in 2007 had a household saving rate of
41% and those in Shenzen had a saving rate of 42%."
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the list, followed by saving to build houses in home villages (32%), and savings for illnesses and
disaster planning (28.5%). Therefore, precautionary saving motivations are clearly crucial, but
Brugiavini, Weber and Wu (2010) describe another motive that will be emphasized by our model:
"Young consumers would save despite the prospects of high income growth because they anticipate
moving to a di¤erent social environment where consumption needs are higher [...]. Moreover, "if
they also have a transfer motive in their preferences, they may keep saving in old age to allow their
children to fully enjoy the opportunities o¤ered by their urban environment".
Given the nancial system imperfections in China, there are few alternatives to funneling these
savings into deposits in the state-owned banking system, with the implicit deposit insurance pro-
vided by the government. Therefore, the abundant bank liquidity largely nances investment by
state enterprises. Their important ine¢ ciencies have costs that "are probably ultimately borne by
depositors, in terms of low real returns on their savings" (Prasad and Rajan, 2006). Such low in-
terest rates are also important for the borrowersinvestment purposes. These borrowers are usually
urban-hukou holders, which gives rise to higher inequality within the cities.
In what follows, we will describe some of the institutional and behavioral characteristics in the life
of rural-hukou migrants. In section 3, our model will be introduced with assumptions arguably based
on such characteristics. Section 4 compares our model to other strands of the related theoretical
literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional bases of migration and urban labor markets
in China
The institution of hukou has been inherited from a pre-reform period of very strong government
controls. It keeps some similarities with the old Soviet "propiska", which was used to tie the access
to services and resources to the registration system. In fact, it reected the states commitment to
sustain the privilege of urbanites, by anchoring peasants to the land and ensuring a geographical
transfer of value from rural to urban areas (Fan, 2002).
Today the economic reforms and the subsequent consumerism have forced some readaptation of
the state institutions; still, temporary jobs keep a marginalized and underclass existence in society.
In order to escape this trap, migrants are often upward movers responding to the large gaps in
income and employment opportunities. In fact, they can even modify sometimes their hukou status,
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always after experiencing some forms of success. For instance, "the criteria for obtaining a blue
stamp include a large investment or home purchase and age, education and skills".
However the migrantsprobability of success is considerably lower, due mainly to the long run
consequences of their educational disadvantage in the city (Meng and Zhang, 2010; Liang and
Chen, 2005). Moreover, this lower upward economic mobility of migrants (in comparison with the
urbanites) is both cause and consequence of segregated labor markets, in which migrants with low
human capital are hardly able to collocate in rms and localities with high skilled urbanites (Fu and
Gabriel, 2012).
According to Meng and Zhang (2010), such segregation probably limits both the labor-market
substitutability between migrants and unskilled urbanites, and their labor-market complementarity
with skilled urbanites. Accordingly, their empirical results indicate that the impact of an enhanced
migratory inow on the labor-market income and employment of urban-hukou holders (regardless
of their skill) is negligible, if not slightly positive.
This standard empirical result, obtained in the context of many di¤erent countries (Ottaviano
and Peri, 2007), is at odds with many theoretical predictions. "The inconsistency between the
theory and the empirical evidence has shaken the basis of the traditional belief that an immigrant
inux should lower the wage of competing factors (Borjas, 2003), and calls for new evidence and new
explanations" (Meng and Zhang, 2010). In this respect, our model o¤ers a potential explanation
based on a pure capital market complementarity between migrants and urbanites: since rural-hukou
holders become relevant net lenders in the city, it becomes easier mainly for new generations of
urbanites to invest, upgrade their skills and increase their future labor-market earnings.
3 Model
This urban economy consists of a population of urbanites (henceforth natives) equal to one. In the
rst period of time (t = 0) there is a migratory shock andM migrants arrive unexpectedly to the city.
They start their urban life during the youth, before accumulating any human capital. Their training
and investment costs in the city are higher than those of natives; without loss of generality, we will
assume that newly arrived migrants and their o¤spring exhibit the same training and investment
costs. The upgrading opportunities o¤ered to them by the urban credit markets are supposed to be
absent in their original rural environment.
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3.1 Technology
The receiving urban economy shows a production technology that combines both skilled and unskilled
labor in a perfectly competitive environment. Most traditional models of the immigration surplus
focus on labor-market complementarities derived from a limited degree of substitutability between
unskilled and skilled labor (and/or physical capital); once unskilled wages fall, immigration results
in a net gain for the native population, after the new surplus is appropriated by the capital owners
(or by the skilled workers). The latter factors of production will gain, whereas unskilled workers will
lose.
In contrast to these explanations, here we will focus on a pure capital market complementarity.
Both types of labor are perfect substitutes and, consequently, their respective wages are not altered
by immigration. Even in this situation we will show that the availability of new loanable funds for
investment, the subsequent reduction of the equilibrium interest rate and the easier skill upgrading
for the future generations will induce a rise in the aggregate labor income of natives.
This assumption of perfect substitutability is made to sharpen our point, since in this way we can
switch o¤ any sort of labor-market complementarity and emphasize our particular chain of causality.
The value of the urban unskilled wage will be equal to 1 and the skilled wage will be given by   1.
3.2 Preferences
In our model (whose time setting is based on Galor and Zeira (1993)) individuals live for two periods.
In the rst one they must decide whether to invest (either in human capital or in the creation of a
startup; the precise form of the investment will be indi¤erent for us) or to work as unskilled labor.
Whenever they decide to invest, they could benet from a parental bequest. In the second period
they work according to their skills, consume, have a child and potentially leave a bequest.
Parents do not bequeath physical or nancial capital in their second period of life. Alternatively,
they can hire some qualied professors to teach their child at home and reduce her future training
costs. More specically, if the parents nd the child to be capable enough they will nance some
hours (x) of home teaching. Such a transfer will reduce the childs needed number of hours in college
by the amount ax; where a is a measure of the idiosyncratic ability of the child.
We adopt the assumption of risk neutrality in preferences and warm glow altruism. Parents
derive utility from the future income enjoyed by the child, gross of nancial costs of investment. Let
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us consider the following utility function, expressed in expected terms:
Ut = ct + EtWt+1;  > 0 (1)
where ct stands for consumption (during adulthood) of an individual born at (t  1), and EtWt+1
stands for the expected (gross) income accruing to the next generation, born at period t.  is an
indicator of the level of parental altruism towards the next generation.
3.3 Investment decision
If a young native (migrant) individual born at t decides to acquire education, he will have to hire
a quantity  (0) of skilled professors, where by assumption 1 > 0 > . The way to do so will be
borrowing from the student loan market in period t and repaying the loan (plus the interests) in
period (t+ 1). His own ability (measured by a), combined with the paternal human capital bequest
(x), will allow him to reduce the investment costs.
In particular, education is today a major instrument for occupational mobility in China (Chow
and Shen, 2005). In response to the increasing demand for tertiary education, its nancing and
provision has shifted gradually from government institutions to non-government institutions sensitive
to market forces.2 "Since economic reform started, non government schools have sprung up rapidly
at all levels".
3.3.1 Decision by the child
When deciding whether to invest (and/or upgrade skills) in period t, a young native individual
(a child) will make the following comparison: (2 + rt+1) will be her earnings from an unskilled
profession, whereas (   (   ax)  (1 + rt+1)) will be the earnings from a skilled job. The earnings
must be measured in units of period (t+ 1), since it is then when her consumption will take place.
 is a measure of the training or investment costs, which depend on the skilled wage () be-
cause only skilled professors are able to train the students. The term ax represents the amount of
training that the individual can skip due to the familial transmission of human capital (x) and his
idiosyncratic ability (a).
2The private share within the total funding for education was 15.5% in 1991 and 36.3% in 2002. Moreover, many
educational institutions were often "government owned" but "people run" public schools.
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Unskilled individuals will work in both periods and save the initial earnings for their second one
(adulthood), when they are supposed to consume and bequeath. Those young individuals determined
to become skilled will borrow from the unskilled to pay for their training/investment costs in the
rst period, and then will repay their debt once they receive the skilled wage in the second period.
Consequently, by comparing the two algebraic expressions in the preceding paragraph an solving for
the cuto¤ ability value, a young native individual (born at t) will decide to invest if and only if
at  1
x

 +

(2 + rt+1)  
 (1 + rt+1)

 
x
, where  

 +

(2 + rt+1)  
 (1 + rt+1)

(2)
A similar cuto¤ expression will hold for a migrant child, provided that we replace  by 0 (> ). This
higher value of the investment cost for migrants is our way to introduce the incidence of hukous
restrictions on the decision making of the urban economy.
More specically, Heckman (2005) emphasizes that "the 10% increase in the cost of schooling
as a fraction of household income for the children of migrants currently reduces social mobility and
perpetuates intergenerational poverty".
3.3.2 Decision by the parent
Our assumption is that parents observe the realization of the childs random ability variable and
decide upon leaving a human capital bequest or not on the basis of such realization. From (2), they
know that their child will invest if and only if their bequest is such that x  a . Taking into account
their preferences in (1), parents will compare their current costs and future benets of providing a
bequest. The costs are given by the number a of professors they would need to hire at a wage of ,
while their benets come from the childs future gross benets (before their debts have been repaid).
Given that their warm glow altruistic motive depends on gross eranings, parents will bequeath
exactly what their child needs to become skilled, and never more. It will (will not) be worth for
them to leave a bequest if and only if
 (   (2 + rt+1)) > (<)  
at
(3)
This will happen only if the ability realization is high enough. From (3), they will leave a bequest
provided that
at   (rt+1)  2 + rt+1    (1   (1 + rt+1))
 (   (2 + rt+1)) (1 + rt+1) (4)
This parental boundary value for the ability realization () is the only relevant cuto¤ for the decision
making, since parents can control the investment behavior of children. It is also important to check
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that ddr > 0: a higher interest rate makes investment less attractive and increases the cuto¤ ability
value to receive a bequest.
Let us denote by 0 the relevant cuto¤ value for immigrants, who only di¤er from natives because
0 > . We also assume that a is a random variable following a generic distribution function F (a),
with support on a 2 [0;1), such that F 0(a)  0 8a.
3.4 Existence and uniqueness of a steady-state competitive equilibrium
Let us consider now an endogenous, equilibrium interest rate rt that clears the credit market at
any date in time. We will focus our attention on a steady state value of this endogenous variable
(r), and will obtain some conditions required for its existence and uniqueness in this economy. Our
competitive equilibrium can be dened as a positive interest rate and a subsequent allocation of
natives and migrants across the skilled and unskilled occupations, such that the supply of credit by
the unskilled is identical to the demand for credit by the future generation of skilled workers.
Who is supplying credit in the city at any point in time t? There are two distinct sources of saving:
rst, the young population born at t that does not invest and will save their whole unskilled wage
(equal to 1) for their adulthood at (t+ 1); secondly, those parents born at (t  1) with su¢ ciently
capable children will save and bequeath according to the expressions in section 3.3.2.
On the other hand, the demand for credit for investment comes from the su¢ ciently capable young
population of natives and migrants. Their individual investment will be equal to the remuneration of
skilled professors they need to hire at t, namely  and 0 for urbanites and migrants, respectively.
Taking all this into consideration, it is possible to derive that the relevant equilibrium condition in
steady state is:
F () +MF (0) =  [(   ) (1  F ()) +M (0   0) (1  F (0))] (5)
On the left hand side of this equation we have the supply of loanable funds by the unskilled workers.
On the right hand side we can observe the aggregate expenditure on training, which amounts to
the remuneration of skilled professors minus the quantity skipped due to parental bequests. Taking
expressions (2) and (5) into account, our previous expression boils down to
   (2 + r)
(1 + r)
h
1  F () +M

1  F


0i
= F () +MF


0
(6)
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By manipulating carefully the previous equality we can derive our Lemma 1, on the conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of a steady state competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 1: If  (1  0)  2, there exists a unique steady state competitive equilibrium char-
acterized by an interest rate r 2 (0;    2), with positive measures of the native and immigrant
population on both sides of the credit market (the lending side and the borrowing side).
Proof. If we multiply both sides of expression (6) by (1 + r) and rearrange terms, it is possible to
characterize in a di¤erent way the equilibrium in the credit market. Let us dene Z (r) as follows:
Z (r) 
h
(   (2 + r)) (1 +M)  (   1)

F () +MF


0i
(7)
We can observe that there will be an equilibrium whenever Z (r) = 0. From (4) we can conclude
that the value of r that makes 
0
= 0 is
~r 


1  0

  2
1 + 0
(8)
That is, ~r is the value of the interest rate that shuts down the supply of credit. For lower values,
there will be nobody willing to save. On the other hand, the value of the interest rate that shuts
down the demand for credit is precisely
r     2
This is true because, for r  r, the bequests would allow all students to invest for free and nobody
would need to apply for a loan.
Now we have to prove that our equilibrium interest rate r is such that ~r < r < r and is also
unique. It is straightforward to show that Z(~r) = ( 1)
0
1+0
> 0 and also Z (r) =   (   1) (1 +M) <
0.
Moreover, a thorough inspection of (7) reveals that Z(r) is a continuous, di¤erentiable, strictly
decreasing function for all values of r. Following Bolzanos theorem, this implies there exists a unique
value for r 2 (0;    2) such that Z (r) = 0, provided that ~r  0, i.e. that  (1  0)  2.
Furthermore, 0 (r) >  (r) > 0, which involves that there are positive measures of the native
and immigrant populations on both sides of the credit market.
Lemma 1 makes clear the requirement of relatively advantageous investment opportunities, both
in terms of the future returns () and the short run costs

 and 
0

, for the existence of an active
demand side of the credit market. Such conditions guarantee that the supply side will be active
as well, since market clearing ensures that one side will not shut down while the other is active.
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Additionally, the equilibrium interest rate (r) is shown to be unique, which facilitates our task of
predicting the e¤ects of immigration.
3.5 The availability of new loanable funds
We are now ready to spell out our desired e¤ect of immigration on the availability of loanable
funds for investment. As we anticipated above, in this setting loans are supplied by young unskilled
workers. They are received by the remaining (more capable) youngsters to nance the share of
their investment costs uncovered by the parental bequests. Migration provides the city with a
higher proportion of unskilled people supplying funds, which will be useful to reduce the equilibrium
interest rate in the student loan market (r).
A lower r will also decrease the minimum ability requirements (the cuto¤ values of  and 
0
)
needed to access highly remunerated jobs. Therefore, for the new migration wave to provide the city
with a net supply of loanable funds, migrants need to face higher investment costs (
0
> ) in order
to enlarge the pool of young lenders more than the pool of young borrowers. Consequently, it will
be possible to speak of an immigration surplus (in terms of the labor income of natives3) that does
not depend on wage variations.
Proposition 1 If 0 > , then a higher initial migratory shock (higher M) will reduce r;  and 0
( ddM < 0,
d
0
dM < 0,
dr
dM < 0). The steady-state aggregate labor income of urbanites will increase with
immigration.
Proof. From (6) we can totally di¤erentiate with respect to M and solve for dr

dM , obtaining that
dr
dM
=
(   (2 + r))  (   1)F (0)h
MF 0 (0) d
0
dr + F
0 () ddr + (1 +M)
i (9)
Furthermore, we can rearrange (6) to nally get that
   (2 + r) = (   1) (F (
0)M + F ())
1 +M
(10)
If we now plug (10) into (9), we can nally derive that
dr
dM
=
(   1)

F ()  F


0

(1 +M)
h
MF 0 (0) d
0
dr + F
0 () ddr + (1 +M)
i (11)
3By aggregate labor income of natives we understand the sum of the remunerations to both skilled and unskilled
labor.
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We already know from (4) that ddr > 0,
d
0
dr > 0 and hence the denominator of the last expression is
positive for sure. For (11) to be negative we thus need the numerator to be lower than zero, which
requires 
0
> . This last inequality holds if and only if

0
> 
Then, since the ability cuto¤s are increasing functions of the interest rate, ddM < 0,
d
0
dM < 0,
dr
dM < 0.
Finally, since wages are invariant and  > 1, a higher share of skilled urbanites means that their
aggregate labor income increases.
4 Comparison with other related theoretical literature
Some recent models, inspired by the case of China, have argued about the convenience of migration
restrictions from the viewpoint of allocative e¢ ciency and/or accumulation and development (Fan
and Stark, 2008; Vendryes, 2011). Fan and Stark present a static model where human capital
externalities at the urban level determine the ine¢ ciency of free migration, since many disfavored
Western areas may lose most of its existing human capital stock.
On the other hand, Vendryes also emphasizes (in a dynamic model of capital accumulation)
the role of hukou as a determinant of the huge Chinese saving rates. However, in his paper the
conceptual denition of hukou points directly to a limitation in the inow of Western migrants to
the Eastern cities. That is, his message could be summarized as follows: less East-West migration
implies higher aggregate saving and growth under certain conditions.
In our model, unlike Vendryes (2011), we represent hukou by means of higher relative investment
costs for a given stock of migrants. Therefore, we prove that a larger migratory inow in the presence
of higher training and investment costs for migrants, gives rise to higher saving. We believe that the
Chinese internal migration (with its e¤ect on urbanization) is a large scale phenomenon that has
been always gaining momentum, instead of losing it. Therefore, we nd it appropriate to underline
the di¤erences with respect to the rest of the literature.
5 Conclusions
It is already well known that in China "households are net lenders to other sectors [...], largely
through deposits in banks and post o¢ ces." (Bardhan, 2010). However, our paper formalizes the
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special role of urbanization and rural-urban migration in this process. Once migrants get acquainted
with the reality of developed urban markets of goods, labor skills and credit, they are known to
change their aspirations and become net lenders, even with higher intensity than urbanites.
Therefore we argue that the resilience of the hukou institution, in parallel with the massive
recent urbanization, may well be crucial to account for the fast pace of national accumulation. And
perhaps for some of our global nancial imbalances as well. The removal of hukou may be a possible
way to limit the magnitude of these imbalances. In that sense, we o¤er a rationalization for such
hypothesis.
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